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Abstract
The Utility Distribution System (UDS) of the Space Station Freedom (SSF) is, in
part, responsible for routing avionic and fluid utilities along the pre-integrated truss
segments. These lines arc housed in a rectangular aluminum carrier that provides
protection from the impacts of meteoroid and orbital debris (M/OD) particles. An initial
analysis completed by McDonnell Douglas Aerospace-Huntington Beach estimated that
the avionic lines in the UDS carrier could experience approximately 200 failures per year.
This number is based on a very conservative failure criteria that any penetration into the
avionic portion of the UDS carrier would cause an avionic line to fail. This conservative
criteria had to be used because little is known about the effects of M/OD on avionic and
fluid lines, especially behind a protective carrier cover. As a result, a two-phase joint
NASA Johnson Space Center and McDonnell Douglas Aerospace-Huntington Beach
hypervelocity impact (I-IV'I) test program was initiated to develop an improved
understanding of how M/OD impacts affect the SSF avionic and fluid lines routed in the
UDS carrier.
This report documents the first phase of the test program which covers nonpowered
avionic line segment and pressurized fluid line segment HVI testing. From these tests, a
better estimation of avionic line failures is approximately 15 failures per year and could
very well drop to around I or 2 avionic line failures per year (depending upon the results
of the second phase testing of the powered avionic line testing at White Sands). For the
fluid lines, the initial McDonnell Douglas analysis calculated 1 to 2 line failures over a 30
year period. The data obtained from these tests indicate the number of predicted fluid
line failures increased slightly to as many as 3 in the first 10 years and up to 15 for the
entire 30 year life of SSF.
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Introduction
Since the Space Station Freedom (SSF) will be exposed to a low Earth orbit (LEO)
environment (up to a 500-km altitude), it must be designed to withstand both meteoroid and
orbital debris (M/OD) collisions. Specifically, the Utility Distribution System (UDS) is
required to provide M/OD protection for its fluid and avionic lines to a level that, when
considering redundancy and repair capability, provides an acceptable system. Yet, little
information exists on how M/OD impacts affect pressurized fluid and avionic lines behind a
protective bumper.
For the UDS, the protective bumper is the utility carrier--a rectangular box that runs the
length of the Space Station and made of 0.64 mm (0.025 in.) thick 7075-T73 aluminum
(A1). There are two primary carriers where utility lines are routed, one on face 2 and one on
face 6 of the hexagonal pre-integrated truss (P1T) segments.
One way of estimating the level of M/OD impacts or failures for a particular design is
to use penetration equations that have been derived from empirical data of previous
hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests. These equations, such as the Cour-Palais or
Fish/Summers penetration equations, provide an analytical method to make these
estimations. A study performed by McDonnell Douglas Aerospace-Huntington Beach
(MDA-HB) in July of 1991 calculated the number of failures that can be expected of the
UDS fluid and avionic lines inside the carders (reference MDA-HB report no. MDC91-
H0643, section 4.5.3). The results showed 5650 avionic line failures and 1 to 2 fluid line
failures over a 30 year period (or approximately 200 failures/year). It is important to note
that a very conservative failure criteria assumption was used for the avionic lines because
of the lack of available data regarding M/OD impacts on utility lines. The assumption
used was that any penetration through the carrier would cause an avionic line failure.
To better understand M/OD impacts and the affect they have on the avionic and fluid
lines in the LIDS carder, an HVI test program was initiated. This coordinated test program
being performed by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and MDA-HB is separated into two
phases. The fast phase of tests, under the direction of the Power Branch of the Propulsion
and Power Division, is with segments of inactive avionic lines and pressurized fluid utility
lines behind a simulated UDS carder cover. The second phase uses active avionic lines and
pressurized fluid lines (with longer lengths of lines and representative fluid system
volumes). These tests in the second phase will be conducted with the articles behind both a
simulated LIDS carder and housed in a flight-like UDS carrier.
The testing described in this report covers the HVIs completed on the inactive UDS
avionics lines and pressurized fluid lines (phase 1), at the JSC Hypervelocity Impact
Research Laboratory (HIRL), from January through May of 1992 and September through
October of 1992, respectively. Its primary objective was to perform an engineering
characterization of the damage tolerance of the UDS lines inside the carders. This
information will feed directly into building the test matrix for the next phase of the avionic
and fluid line tests that is to be conducted at White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). A
secondary objective was to investigate the effects of the HVIs on functional characteristics
of the avionic lines. Also, a more realistic number of failures of UDS lines inside the carrier
will be estimated using the test data and a probability analysis computed by the BUMPER-
E M/OD modeling code.
Test Article Description
The test articles used are representative of the LIDS avionics and fluid lines which are
enclosed inside the carrier in individual sections separated by a thin metal barrier. Figure 1
shows a typical portion of the current baseline configuration of the utility carders on the
PIT.
Avionic Lines
The types of avionic lines tested were secondary power, primary power, coaxial, 1553
data bus, and fiber optic lines. Except for the primary power line tests, the test articles for
each HVI were usually two bundles, each consisting of 7 lines that were approximately 30.5
- 35.6 cm (12 - 14 in.) long with minimal spacing between the bundles. The goal here was
to provide adequate target area for an accurate shot and enough length of line to capture as
much debris as possible. Because interest was being focused on the lines of the bundle that
were struck first by the particle/debris, a lot of excess lines in the bundle were not
necessary.
The primary power lines had a large enough diameter that bundling was not required,
so, two or three individual lines provided a sufficient target area. Figure 2 shows the typical
cross sections of the UDS test articles that were used for the HVIs. Some specifications
for the avionic lines are given in appendix A.
The test articles were placed approximately 8.5 cm (3.35 in.) behind a 15.2 x 15.2 cm
(6 x 6 in.) piece of 0.64 mm (0.025 in.) thick 7075-T73 A1 bumper that represented the
UDS carrier cover. In an M/OD protection system, the bumper is a single sheet of material
that is used to break up the incoming particle. This dissipates the particle's energy and
makes the resulting debris cloud less potent. A constant distance of 8.5 cm was used
because it represented the worst case (shortest) spacing between the avionic lines and the
bumper. According to MDA-HB drawing no. 1F02896 (August 1991), the distance
between the UDS carder cover and the largest bundle had been approximated at 8.5 cm.
Furthermore, the size of the bundles could vary and this dimension had not been determined
for the actual bundles in the Space Station carder.
In addition, a witness plate of 0.64 mm thick 7075-T'/3 A1 was placed typically 20.3 cm
(8.0 in.) behind the bumper (approximately 11.4 cm or 4.5 in. behind the test articles). This
distance corresponds to the depth of the actual Space Station carrier. Information on the
dimensions of materials and spacing used for all the avionic tests are also given in tables la
and 2a.
An example of the typical layout of the avionic test articles and the simulated UDS
carrier in the test cell, for a shot with an impact angle of 0 ° (relative to the projectile's path),
is illustrated in figure 3. A photograph of an actual secondary power line test setup, in the
JSC HIRL 4.3 mm light gas gun, is shown in figure 4.
Fluid Lines
The tubing used for the fluid line test articles represented the SSF Active Thermal
Control System (ATCS), Environmental Control and Life Support System ('ECLSS), and
the Supplemental Reboost System (SRS). All the tubing was 304L stainless steel and had
the following outer diameters (OD) and wall thicknesses:
ATCS:
ECLSS:
SRS:
4.45 cm OD x 0.089 cm wall (1.75 in. OD x 0.035 in. wall); welded
1.27 cm OD x 0.051 cm wall (0.50 in. OD x 0.020 in. wall); seamless
0.95 cm OD x 0.089 cm wall (0.375 in. OD x 0.035 in. wall); seamless
The tubes were cut to about 36 cm (14 in.) lengths and the ends were flared to
accommodate 37 ° military standard fittings. These end fittings were used to adapt the test
articles to the 1/4 in. tubing required by the JSC HIRL pressure system. For the large
diameter ATCS lines, special reducers had to be constructed by welding a 1/4 in. union to a
1.75 in. plug and drilling a hole through the assembly. These special plugs and the rest of
the fluid test article preparations were fabricated at the JSC Thermochernical Test Area.
The spacing between the fluid test articles and the bumper varied depending upon the
size of the fluid line being shot. These distances were based on the spacing of the carrier
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barfrom thecarrier cover shown in MDA-HB drawing no. 1F02896 and are given in tables
3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b. The bumper and wimess plate material (0.64 mm thick 7075-T73 A1)
and dimensional specifications used are the same as in the avionic line tests. The witness
plate was placed 20.3 cm behind the bumper.
A photograph of one of the ATCS fluid line HVI test setups, at an impact angle of 45 °
(relative to the path of the projectile), is shown in figure 5.
Test Procedure and System Setup
Avionic Lines
Each avionic HVI test consisted of four parts: a pre-HVI functional check, the HVI
shot, a post-HVI functional check, and the visual inspection/physical damage
documentation. The functional checks were performed to determine the current carrying
capability of the lines before and after the H'VI tests. This consisted of light signal
degradation measurements for the fiber optic lines, or resistance and dielectric breakdown
(current leakage) measurements for the other types of avionic lines. A more detailed
description of these functional checks is given in appendix B. Two of the three HIRL light
gas guns, the 1.7 mm and the 4.3 mm guns, were used for this portion of the testing. For
each shot, the test article was installed at the required impact angle and the target chamber
evacuated. The vacuum level in the chamber depended upon which light gas gun was used.
The smaller, 1.7 mm (0.07 caliber) gun uses aerodynamic sabot separation, and it was
evacuated to approximately 9.5 - 10 torr (about 0.2 psia). The 4.3 mm (0.17 caliber) gun
has a rifled barrel and was pumped down to a vacuum level, approximately 0.5 - 2.0 tort
(0.01 - 0.04 psia), for the shot. After the shot, the test articles were photographed,
examined, and sent through the post-test functional checks. All HVI shots, test parameters,
and results of the inspections are discussed in the Test Results section.
Fluid Lines
The testing for each type of tubing was composed of two parts: 1) fluid lines at
ambient pressure and 2) fluid lines at maximum on-orbit system pressure. The test article
was installed in the target chamber of the 4.3 mm light gas gun at the specified impact angle
(figure 5), and the target chamber was evacuated to approximately 0.5 - 2.0 torr (0.01 - 0.04
psia). All of the fluid line tests were performed with the 4.3 mm gun. The test article was
then pressurized and the light gas gun was fired. A schematic of the JSC HIRL pressure
system is shown in figure 6. After the shot, a visual inspection was made to document the
damage on the lines. This included examinations with a borescope, a Scanning Electron
Microscope (SEM), and a metallograph. These findings are described in the Test Results
section.
Test Results
The main objective of this test program was to gather data on the physical damage to
the UDS carrier utility lines sustained from simulated M/OD HVIs. Also, the effects these
particles have on the functional characteristics of the avionic lines were examined. The
information obtained during the HVI tests and post-shot functional examinations is used to
establish a ballistic limit of the utility lines that are protected by the UDS carrier. This leads
to a better estimation of the number of avionic and fluid line failures to be expected and a
better estimation of whether the current UDS M/OD protection design is adequate.
Theterm ballistic limit is used to describe the conditions that cause a failure in a
particular shield system. For this test program, the shield system consisted of the protective
bumper (carrier cover) and the rearwall (fluid or avionic line test articles). A ballistic limit is
defined by the parameters of the particle impact such as particle velocity, particle size and
material, impact angle, and the type of fluid or avionic line test article. For example, the
initial shot at a shield system uses a certain size particle at a set velocity. The particle size is
increased (or decreased) until the smallest particle which causes the shield system to fail is
found. At that point, a ballistic limit for that system, particle, and velocity has been
determined, but for these parameters only. If any one of these variables is changed, then
testing must be performed to determine a new ballistic limit.
For this HVI testing, the basic emphasis was to determine what size particle, traveling at
approximately 6.5 km/s and hitting the bumper at 0 ° or 45 °, would cause a failure of the
avionic and fluid lines in the UDS carrier. In other words, the goal was to establish the
ballistic limit of the UDS lines in the carrier for particles striking the cover at 6.5 km/s at an
impact angle of 0 ° or 45 °. This data was then directly used by the BUMPER-E impact
analysis tool to get a better determination of the effectiveness of the UDS carrier to protect
the lines from M/OD (see Conclusions and Recommendations).
A detailed description of the test articles, the shots, and the physical and functional
checkout results can be referenced in tables la, lb, 2a, and 2b for the avionic lines and tables
3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b for the fluid lines. A listing of all photographs taken during this test
program is given in appendix C.
An important note for this testing is that there are a number of shots where a piece of
debris (either from the pump tube piston or a piece of sabot that was shed from around the
particle) trailed the particle through the light gas gun and impacted the bumper plate. Based
on the visual evidence left by the debris and the expertise of the members of the HIRL, this
debris did not affect the damage on the test articles that were sustained from the actual HVI
particle. Where there was a question regarding the significance of the debris on the test
article damage, a repeat shot was performed.
Avionic Lines
A set of criteria was established for these HVI tests to determine the extent of
functional damage the lines would have to receive to classify them as failed. This failure
criteria was put together with the help of SSF engineers responsible for the particular type
of avionic lines used in these tests. For the power, data bus, and coaxial lines, the failure
criteria was > 5 mA of current leakage and/or a 10 - 15% increase in resistance. For the
fiber optic lines, a signal loss of 8 - 10 dB constituted a failed line.
Secondary Power Lines
The first set of HVI shots conducted for this test program used secondary power lines
as the test articles. Because little was known of the effects of M/OD on avionic lines, the
initial shots were conservative using very small particle sizes. Figure 7 shows the bumper
and witness plate mounted in the test setup from HIRL shot no. 1941 (post-HYI and with
test articles removed). Figure 8 is a close-up picture of these test articles from HIRL shot
no. 1941. This shot used a 0.8 mm (1/32 in.) diameter A1 sphere traveling 6.66 km/s. The
particle penetrated the simulated carrier cover, but did very little physical damage and did not
degrade the insulation or increase the resistance of the lines. This is very important because
the MDA-HB estimation described earlier used a failure assumption that any penetration
through the carrier would cause an avionic line failure. These tests prove that even though
the particle penetrates the bumper (simulated carrier cover) a failure does not necessarily
result. HIRL shot no. A1492 is another example of the particle perforating the bumper, yet
causing no functional deterioration in the lines (figure 9 and tables la and lb).
A preciseballisticlimit wasnotdeterminedfor secondarypowerlines. A 2.4mm (3/32
in.) diameterA1spherestrikingthesimulatedcarriercoverat45° (HIRL shot no. A1494)
was the biggest particle fired at the secondary power lines. It caused a large amount of
physical damage (figures 10, 11, and 12), and a few of the test article lines indicated some
slight increases in resistance during the post-HV checkout. There was no dielectric
breakdown of the insulation on any of the secondary power lines. For this part of the HVI
test program, the parameters of A1494 are on the borderline of the ballistic limit curve, and
the WSTF active line testing will better establish this limit.
Primary Power Lines
For the primary power lines, an exact ballistic limit was not identified. The HVI of a
3.2 mm (1/8 in.) diameter A1 sphere striking the bumper at 45 ° (HIRL shot no. A1500)
caused significant insulation damage and severed a small number of conductor strands
(figures 13 and 14). However, there was no increase in resistance. Dielectric breakdown
(current leakage) of the lines was not tested.
Coaxial Lines
The ballistic limit for the coaxial lines is estimated to be near the parameters of HJRL
shot no. A1509. For this shot, a 2.4 mm diameter A1 sphere striking the bumper at 45 ° was
used, and it damaged one line enough to expose the inner conductor (figure 15). This line
did not increase in its resistance reading, but it did have > 5mA of current leakage from the
inner conductor to the outer shield. This is enough loss in insulation protection to cause a
functional failure of that line (appendix B).
1553 Data Bus Lines
HIRL shot no. A1532 used a 2.4 mm diameter A1 sphere striking at 45 ° and caused
significant dielectric breakdown (> 5mA of current leakage = failure assumption) in several
lines of both test article bundles. The physical damage to the data bus lines from this shot
is depicted in figures 16 and 17. The results of this test indicate that the parameters are well
within the ballistic limit since many lines failed. A smaller particle was not shot at these
lines, but it will be included as part of the recommendations for the active avionic HVI tests
at WSTF.
Fiber Optic Lines
The ballistic limit for the fiber optic lines is found from the HIRL shot no. A1539, in
which a 1.6 mm diameter A1 sphere impacted the bumper at 45 °. The signal losses in the
two severely damaged fiber optic lines of shot A1539 were 35.4 and 36.3 dB. Based on the
failure criteria, this is significant enough for a functional failure of the line. The physical
line degradation associated with shot A1539 can be seen in figures 18 and 19.
The ballistic limit conclusion is reached because a repeat of the A1539 parameters was
made (HIRL shot no. A1578), and the post-HVI check showed no loss of light signal
through the line. As seen in figure 20, the physical damage is very similar to the damage to
the fines from HIRL shot A1539. Thus in a worst case, the parameters of A1539 and
A1578 can cause a failure in the fiber optic lines and therefore they lie on the border of the
ballistic limit curve.
In addition, figures 21 and 22 indicate similar findings described in the secondary
power lines summary of results. It can be seen that small particles (< 1.6 mm in diameter)
penetrate the bumper, yet cause little physical damage and no functional damage.
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Fluid Lines
The failure criteria for this testing must be mentioned before interpreting the results in
detail. This criteria is that only a perforation of the test article tube wall is specifically
called a failure and not a specified degree of spall or depth of an impact crater. These latter
two phenomena may have some affect on the strength of the line so that the burst pressure
rating of the line is reduced, but for this testing these damage phenomena will not classify
the test article as a failed line.
Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) Lines
Several shots were performed with the test articles filled with water and pressurized to
101 kPa (14.7 psia) to simulate liquid anamonia filled lines. The most significant results
were obtained from HIRL shot nos. A1622 and A1688. Under the failure criteria stated
previously, the ballistic limit parameters found for this testing come from HIRL shot no.
A1622. It had a 2.4 mm diameter A1 sphere striking the bumper at 45 ° and approximately
6.5 km/s. The failure criteria for the fluid line tests is a perforation of the tube wall, and this
particle caused two perforations, 0.85 x 1.8 mm and 1.52 x 1.52 mm (figure 23). The test
article from HIRL shot no. A1688 used a 2.0 mm diameter particle, striking the bumper at
45 ° and about 6.8 km/s. It sustained some serious crater damage which caused dimpling of
the internal wall, but no perforation resulted.
HIRL shot no. A1690 was performed with nearly the same parameters as A1688,
except that the water in the line was pressurized to the maximum ATCS pressure of- 2.0
MPa (286 psia). This fluid line had serious crater damage which also caused some internal
dimpling, but again, no perforation of the wall occtmed.
Further structural analyses were performed on the fluid line test articles from shots
A1688 and A1690 at the JSC Structures and Mechanics Division Laboratory. Initially, a
borescope was used to get a better picture of the internal dimples. Upon identifying some
potential detached spaU, a series of x-rays was taken to document the tube damage and to
determine if any changes in material density had occurred. These radiography pictures were
inconclusive.
Next, the lines were cut longitudinally and the internal damage photographed. Figure
24 shows a "rift" in a dimple from the inside wall of the HIRL shot no. A1690 test article.
The most heavily damaged area of the lines was subsequently cut from the tubes and the
external craters and internal dimples documented using a JEOL JSM-820 SEM. The pieces
were then sectioned through the crater location and further documented with the SEM. The
SEM examination identified the spalling of the internal tube wall surface, showed the
interface between the particle debris and the fluid line, and noted the compression of the
grain structure at the point of impact. Figure 25 is an example of a typical SEM photo
showing a cross-sectional view of the tube wall from HIRL shot no. A1688, a crater, and the
resultant spalling of the inner wall.
In addition, a cross section of the impact area was looked at using a Zeiss AX10MAT
metallograph. These metallurgical cross sections further clarified the degree of spaUing of
the internal fluid line wall. As can be seen in figures 26 and 27, there is significant damage
to the test article from HIRL shot nos. A1688 and A1690, respectively.
HIRL shot nos. A1688 and A1690 had some debris from the pump tube piston impact
the bumper. This debris may have done some damage to the test articles. The parameters
of HIRL shot A1690 were repeated in HIRL shot no. A1800 to make certain the unwanted
piston did not cause the damage discussed above. Since A1688 and A1690 used very
similar shot parameters, both were not repeated. A1800 was a clean shot and initial
inspection showed several dimples on the internal wall of the test article. The fluid line was
cut open and these dimples closely compared to the ones found in A1688 and A1690.
Therefore, k is concluded (without the need for further destructive analyses) that the damage
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to thetestarticlesfrom shotsA1688andA1690wasindeedcaused by the particle and not
some foreign debris.
Based on the criteria that a perforation of the tube wall constitutes a failure, the
parameters of HIRL shot no. A1622 are obviously beyond the ballistic limit of these fluid
lines. However, the analyses of the test article from shots A1688 and A1690 clearly show
major structural damage to the tube wall at that impact point. This results in a weak spot in
the line, and may be a concern if a pressure surge were to occur. Nonetheless, it can be
concluded that the parameters of HIRL shot nos. A1688 and A1690 are barely below, if not
right at, the ballistic limit for these ATCS lines.
Also, HIRL shot nos. A1688 and A1690 were conducted with almost identical
parameters except for water pressure. It was determined that the higher internal stored
energy of the test article from A1690 did not significantly affect the damage caused during
the HVI. The maximum internal system pressure of approximately 2.0 MPa (286 psia)
stresses this line less than 20% of its yield strength. The slightly deeper craters and visible
internal wall damage on A1690 are more likely due to the lower impact velocity rather than
the higher internal pressure.
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) Lines
These lines simulated a 1.4 MPa (200 psia) gaseous nitrogen (GN2) ECLSS line that
will be used to pressurize the SSF external ATCS tanks and pump module hardware. The
first three shots were performed with the test articles at this SSF system pressure (1.4
MPa), and the results indicate that the ballistic limit is near the parameters of HIRL shot no.
A1631. In this shot, a 2.0 mm diameter particle impacted the bumper at 45 °, and the
subsequent cloud of debris created a 0.8 x 0.8 mm and a 1.0 x 1.1 mm perforation in the
tube wall (figure 28). HIRL shot no. A1640 used a slightly smaller particle size of 1.8 mm
at the exact same parameters and only caused some mamng and craters on the external
surface of the tube.
Next, the 1.8 and 2.0 mm particles were shot at lines also pressurized with GN2, but
only to 101 kPa. The test articles of HIRL shot nos. A1693 (using a 2.0 mm particle) and
A1695 (using a 1.8 mm particle) both sustained perforations of the tube wall. Shot A1693
resulted in a hole in the tube approximately 0.6 x 0.7 ram. The penetration in the line from
A1695 is 1.1 x 1.6 mm and though it is believed to have been caused by the actual test
particle striking the bumper, it could have originated from the piece of debris that followed
the particle. This debris impacted the bumper very close to where the test particle did, so it
is difficdt to determine which may have caused the tube wall perforation. As a result, the
parameters of shot A1695 were repeated in HIRL shot no. A1749 and no perforation of the
test article resulted. However, two visible dimples on the internal surface were found and on
further examination, one of the dimples had detached spall. Therefore, it is determined that
the parameters of HIRL shot no. A1693 are just past the ballistic limit for these ECLSS
lines, while A1749 (and A1695) is right on the limit.
Supplemental Reboost System (SRS) Lines
Two shots were conducted with lines that represented the SSF SRS lines. The SSF
SRS will collect, store, and propulsively dispose of waste gases. For these tests, the lines
were pressurized with GN2 to the maximum SRS pressure of 6.9 MPa (1000 psia). No
perforations of the tube wall were produced in these two tests, but the test article from HIRL
shot no. A1751 did sustain some significant damage (figure 29). There are two particularly
large and deep craters that penetrate approximately 0.30 - 0.35 mm into the wall and cause
the internal surface of the tube to dimple. These dimples were observed with the borescope,
and it appeared that one could have some possible detached spall.
A structural analysis on the line from shot A1751, similar to the one completed on the
ATCS lines, was completed and documented. Figure 30 definitely indicates some detached
7
spallon thefightinternaldimple and thestartingof some detached spallon theother(small
crack/flakingofmaterial).Furtherobservationunder thestereoscopicmicroscope
substantiated the spaUing that occun'ed on the internal surface of the tube. As a result, it is
concluded that the parameters from HIRL shot A1751 lie on the borderline of the ballistic
limit for these lines.
A slower moving piece of debris (relative to the particle) penetrated the bumper
approximately 1.5 cm down and 1.1 cm to the right of the particle impact point. It is similar
to the type of debris seen in the ATCS tests. Because of its speed and location and for the
reasons discussed earlier for the ATCS lines, it is concluded that the particle and not the
debris produced the serious damage to the SRS line described here in the results.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The overall goal of this phase of the HVI test program was to develop an improved
understanding of how M/OD impacts affect the SSF avionic and fluid lines routed in the
UDS carrier. The need for the program arose from the results of some initial and very
conservative analyses which predicted up to 200 failures per year could occur in these UDS
lines. This report documents that the program goal was achieved with great success.
Specifically, the three objectives of 1) perfomaing an engineering characterization of the
damage tolerance of the UDS avionic and fluid lines inside the carrier, 2) investigating the
effects of the simulated M/OD impacts on the functional characteristics of the avionic lines,
and 3) estimating a more realistic number of failures of UDS lines inside the utility carriers,
were sufficiently met. This phase of testing filled a void where little data had previously
existed. The information will help demonstrate how good the baseline UDS carrier design
is from an M/OD protection standpoint and will feed directly into determining how much
extravehicular activity maintenance time is required to replace functionally damaged/failed
UDS lines on SSF. A synopsis of the conclusions reached during the testing is given
below.
Avionic Lines
First, the JSC HVI tests prove that the conservative assumption used in the initial
MDA-HB analysis is not true. This assumption stated that any penetration through the
carrier would cause an avionic line failure. Several tests on the secondary power and fiber
optic lines show that particles less than 1.6 mm in diameter (which constitute a majority of
the particle sizes in the LEO environment) do penetrate the simulated UDS utility carrier
cover, but only do minimal physical damage and do not degrade the insulation or increase
the resistance of the lines.
In addition, some of the physical damage on the avionic lines seemed severe from a
visual standpoint. Insulation was destroyed and often conductors exposed. However, these
lines passed the avionic line functional checks, indicating the cabling would work properly.
Therefore, they were not considered failures.
These conclusions are made with the understanding that the HVI testing of powered
avionic lines at WSTF will add some crucial data that could alter the answers found here.
At the completion of these JSC HVI tests, a vulnerability analysis was performed by
the JSC Hypervelocity Analysis Laboratory (HAL) using the BUMPER-E computer model.
It predicted the expected number of impacts on the avionics and fluid sections of the LIDS
carrier for several test particle diameters. A more detailed description of the BUMPER
analysis is shown in appendix D. Based on the data obtained from the HVI tests and this
BUMPER nan (which used an updated environment model and penetration equation
compared to the original MDA-HB analysis), a better estimation of the number of failures
to the avionic lines was determined. Instead of anticipating up to 200 avionic line failures
peryear,approximately 15 failures per year was found to be more realistic. This number
is still conservative and could potentially drop to around I or 2 avionic line failures per
year. However, the final determination of the number of avionic line failures will depend
upon the outcome of the powered avionic line HVI testing at WSTF.
An additional conclusion reached from the BUMPER-E computer run was that the
upper LIDS carrier will be hit by more M/OD than the lower carder. This is due to the type
of attitude that the SSF will by flying in LEO. The ratio of impacts on the upper carrier to
the impacts on the lower carrier are as great as 10 to 1 when the Space Shuttle Orbiter is
docked to SSF. When the Orbiter is not docked, the ratio decreases to about 1.7 to 1.
The data gathered in this testing at JSC also provided a lot of background information
for this next phase of tests at WSTF. The following are some recommendations on particle
sizes that could be used during those active line tests.
Secondary_ Power Lines: The initial shot should be with a 2.4 mm or even a 1.6 mm
diameter A1 sphere striking at 45 °. These lines will operate at 120 volts, and under full load
conditions they will carry 58 A. Because of the potential of a high current fault, the smaller
particle is suggested.
primary Power Lines: A shot with a 2.4 mm diameter A1 sphere striking at 45 °
should be used as a starting point for a similar reason as described above for the powered
secondary power lines.
i_,9.11V_..ldll_: A shot with a 1.6 mm diameter A1 sphere striking at 45 ° is suggested
to be used as a starting point during the active avionic HVI tests at WSTF.
1553 Data Bus Lines: It is recommended that the initial shot should be with a 1.6 mm
diameter A1 sphere striking at 45 °. This is because several lines were found to be
functionally damaged with a 2.4 mm diameter particle striking the bumper (HIRL shot no.
A1532). A smaller particle might have enough kinetic energy to cause functional damage to
a single 1553 data bus line. Thus, the parameters of A1532 could be past the ballistic limit.
Fiber Optic Lines: It is recommended that a shot with either a 1.6 mm or slightly
smaller particle (such as a 1 ram) diameter A1 sphere striking at 45 ° should be used as a
starting point.
Fluid Lines
An issue with the fluid line tests was whether the internal pressure of the SSF systems
would add to the hazard of an M/OD impact. This extra potential energy in the test articles
was investigated and found not to be significant for the lines on the Space Station. First, the
hoop stress calculated for the fluid lines used in the I-IVI testing was only 15% to 20%
(maximum) of the yield stress of 304L stainless steel. Second, tests conducted on the
ATCS and ECL_S lines at system and ambient pressures showed little variance in the
degree of damage experienced. For example, the test articles from I-IIRL shot nos. A1688
and A1690 had very similar amounts of damage on the external and internal wall surface.
Another conclusion was that the initial estimate of I to 2 fluid line failures over the 30
year life of the Space Station is slightly low. Based on the distribution of particles
calculated by the BUMPER-E run discussed above and the data from the HVI tests, as
many as 3 fluid line failures could be experienced in the first 10 years and overall up to 15
for the entire 30 year life of SSF. At the conclusion of the WSTF testing and a more
detailed BUMPER-E UDS carder analysis, a better calculation will be provided.
For the WSTF fluid lines, some slight variations on wall thickness will be used based
on additional design information during the planning for phase 2. The data obtained from
phase 1 at JSC will help. pick the appropriate shot parameters for phase 2, but no
recommendations are gaven at this time.
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Figure 4. Secondary Power Line Test Setup for a 0 ° Particle Impact (HIRL Shot No.
A1493) in the JSC 4.3 mm Light Gas Gun.
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Figure 7. Bumper and Witness Plate Mounted in 1.7 mm Light Gas Gun Test Cell from
HIRL Shot No. 1941
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Figure 8. Physical Damage to Secondary Power Lines from HIRL Shot No. 1941
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Figure 9. Physical Damage to Secondary Power Lines from HIRL Shot No, A1492
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Figure 10. Physical Damage to Secondary Power Lines from HIRL Shot No. A1494
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Figure 13. Physical Damage to Primary Power Lines from HIRL Shot No. A1500
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Figure 16. Physical Damage to 1553 Data Bus Lines from HIRL Shot No. A1532
25
ORIGINAI_ PA-GE
BLACK AI_D WHITE PHOTOGRAPH
26
p.
x
x
O
¢'_ °,-q
*,,_ °,jq
C'4 C_
,-_ ¢)
<-_
• ¢)
j:: ,.-
E"
O
¢)
c_
Lz.,
Figure 18. Physical Damage to Fiber Optic Lines from HIRL Shot No. A 1539
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Figure 21. Bumper, Fiber Optic Bundle and Wimess Plate Mounted in 1.7 mm Light Gas
Gun Test Cell from HIRL Shot No. 2020
Figure 22. Physical Damage to Fiber Optic Lines from HIRL Shot No. 2020
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Figure 25. Scanning Electron Microscope Photo of the HIRL Shot No. A1688 TubeWall,
an Impact Crater, and Inner Wall Spalling at a Magnification of 50x
Figure 26. Metallurgical Cross Section of Fluid Line from HIRL Shot No. A1688
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Figure27. MetallurgicalCrossSectionof Fluid Linefrom HIRL ShotNo.A1690
Figure28. PhysicalDamageto EnvironmentalControlandLife SupportSystemLine
from HIRL ShotNo. A1631
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Two large craters
that caused internal
wall dimples shown
in figu_ 30
Figure 29. Physical Damage to Supplemental Reboost System Fluid Line from HIRL
Shot No. A1751
Figure 30. Close-upofDimple on thelntemalWallofFluid Line _omHIRLShotNo.
A1751
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APPENDIX A: DATA FOR THE UDS AVIONIC LINES USED FOR HVI TESTING
1553 Data Bus Cable (MIL-C-17F. M17/176-00002_
Twisted, shielded pair
Inner conductors:
Outer conductor:
Jacket:
Two 24 American wire gage (AWG) consisting of 19
strands of 36 AWG silver-coated, high strength copper alloy
Single braid of 38 AWG silver-coated, high strength
copper alloy wire
PFA; Diameter 0.129 + 0.005 in.
Primary_ Power
1/0 AWG line conductor
Cable diameter:
Conductor:
Insulation:
0.545 + 0.010 in.
Class N, nickel-coated, stranded copper rope lay
Silicone
Secondary Power
Twisted pair, unshielded and unjacketed
Cable diameter: 0.150 in.
Conductors: 18-gage stranded conductors
Insulation: Teflon
Coaxial Cable (RG-142Bfl, I)
Inner conductor:
Dielectric core:
Outer conductor:
Jacket:
Solid silver-coated, copper-covered steel wire
Solid extruded PTFE (inner conductor insulation)
Double braid of 36 AWG silver-coated copper wire
Teflon FEP; Diameter 0.195 + 0.005 in.
Fiber Ootic Cable
100/140 gtm type (core =
Cable diameter:
Optical fiber:
Protective coating:
Tube:
Strength member:
Jacket:
100 gtm, cladding = 140 grn)
0.083 + 0.002 in.
Doped silica (glass)
High temperature polymide compound
Teflon FEP
Braided teflon coated fiberglass
Teflon FEP
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APPENDIX B: PRE-HVIAND POST-HVIAVIONIC LINE FUNCTIONAL
CHECKOUTDESCRIPTION
ThesecheckoutswereconductedbeforeeachHVI testandthenhandcarriedto the
HIRL. After theHVI testwascompleted,thetestarticleswerereturnedto theEPSlab and
thesecheckoutswererepeated.Thisallowedthecurrentcarrying"health"of thelinesto be
detemained.
Thefunctionalchecksfor thepower,1553databus,andcoaxiallineswereperformed
attheEPSLaboratoryin building16atJSC. Thetestequipmentusedfor thispartof the
programareasfollows:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Slaughter Series 103/105 Dielectric Breakdown and Leakage Tester
Hewlett-Packard Model 3456A Digital Multimeter
Valhalla Scientific 2555A AC-DC Current Calibrator
Valhalla Scientific 4300B Digital Micro-ohmmeter
Fluke 343A DC Voltage Calibrator
The functional checks for the fiber optic lines were performed at the Fiber Optic Test
Bench in building 15 at JSC. The test equipment used for this part of the program are as
follows:
1) Noyes Optical Light Source OLS 1-2
2) Noyes Optical Power Meter OPM1-2
PRIMARY POWER LINE CHECKOUT
Resistance Test: Each test article was connected as shown in figure B 1. The insulation on a
test article was fitted against the test blocks and the four bolts were torqued down to 134
inch pounds (this provided a good tight contact without crushing the wires). The Fluke
343A DC Voltage Calibration Source was set to 1 volt and the Valhalla 4300B micro-
ohmmeter was set to test at 2 volts at 10 A. The resistance was then recorded from the
Valhalla 4300B.
SECONDARY POWER LINE CHECKOUT
Resistance Test: Each conductor of the test article was connected as shown in figure B2.
The Valhalla 4300B micro-ohmmeter was set to 200 millivolts and 10 A (with no
temperature compensation being used). The test was initiated and after one minute, the
reading was recorded. This time allowed the test article to settle after experiencing any
initial minor transient or heating effects.
Dielectric Breakdown Test: The Slaughter 103/105 Dielectric Breakdown and Leakage
Tester was set to the DC position, the voltage regulator to the X1 position and a 1200 volts
voltage limit, and the current meter to the X1 position and a 100 gA limit. The timer was set
45
for 30seconds.Theconductorundertestwasthenconnectedto thepositivesideof the
testerwhileall remainingconductorsin thetestarticlebundlewereconnectedto thereturn
side. ThepowerwasturnedonandtheSlaughter103/105wassetto automode.Thetest
wasinitiatedandanycurrentleakagemeasuredon thecurrentmeterwasrecorded.If the
arc indicatorlight namedon,thissignifiedthatthetesterdetectedacurrentleakageof greater
than5 mA. Forthepurposesof thisphaseof thetestprogram,thiscurrentleakage
constitutedafailureof theline. This testwasperformedfor eachconductorof thetest
article.
1553 DATA BUS LINE CHECKOUT
Resistance Test of Inner Conductors: This test is identical to the resistance test for the
secondary power lines except that the Valhalla 4300B micro-ohmmeter was set to 1 A.
Resistance Test of Shield: This test is identical to the resistance test for the secondary
power lines except that the Valhalla 4300B micro-ohmmeter was set to 20 millivolts and 1
A.
Dielectric Breakdown Test: This test is identical to the dielectric breakdown test for the
secondary power lines except the voltage regulator was set to a 1000 volts voltage limit.
COAXIAL LINE CHECKOUT
Resistance Test of Inner Conductors: This test is identical to the resistance test for the
secondary power lines except that the Valhalla 4300B micro-ohmmeter was set to 20
millivolts and 1 A.
Resistance Test of Shield: This test is identical to the resistance test for the secondary
power lines.
Dielectric Breakdown Test: This test is identical to the dielectric breakdown test for the
secondary power lines except the voltage regulator was set to a 1400 volts voltage limit.
FIBER OPTIC LINE CHECKOUT
Light Transmission Degradation Test: Before each fiber optic line was checked, a specific
procedure was performed as shown in figure B3. The Noyes Optical Power Source and
Optical Light Meter were set for a wavelength of 1.3ktm. A launch cable was attached and a
reading taken, reading X. The launch cable is a special fiber optic line with a calibrated
attenuation and is used to establish a baseline loss measurement for the checkouts that will
be performed. Because the light source and meter could not be physically connected to
obtain this measurement, the launch cable was required.
Next, a reading was taken for each fiber optic line test article, reading Y, using the
configuration shown in figure B4. The launch cable is required here to insure that the
baseline loss measurement, established above, is maintained. Finally, reading Y is
subtracted from reading X to obtain the losses for the fiber optic line test article.
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF NASA PHOTOGRAPHS FROM TEST PROGRAM
HIRL Shot No, Photo NO,
1940 S92-27131 - $92-27136
1941 S92-27392 - $92-27396
A 1492 $92-27125 - $92-27130
A1493 S92-27178 - S92-27184
A1494 $92-27397 - S92-27399
A1498 $92-28248 - $92-28251
A1500 $92-27914- S92-27917
A1505 $92-28274- $92-28277
A 1507 $92-28311 - $92-28313
A1509 $92-29010- $92-29013
A1517 S92-29006- $92-29009
A1526 S92-29724 - $92-29728
A1532 $92-31113 - $92-31117
2020 S92-32079 - $92-32082
A1539 $92-32519 - $92-32521
A1543 $92-32758 - $92-32759
A1576 $92-36091 - $92-36094
A1578 $92-36095 - $92-36098
A1613
A1614
A1622
A1626
A1631
A1640
A1651
A1688
A1690
A1693
A1695
A1749
A1750
A1751
Photo No,
S92-39034- $92-39036
S92-39037- $92-39040
N/A
$92-41718-$92-41721
$92-41715- $92-41717,$92-41722
N/A
S92-43375- $92-43380
S92-47372
S92-47371
S92-47368
S92-47370
$92-49389
$92-49381
$92-49385
&$92-47375
& $92-47374
& $92-47369
& $92-47373
-$92-49392
-$92-49384
-$92-49388
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APPENDIX D: BUMPER-E VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE UDS TRAYS
//
.
EnBineer.;n_ & Sciences Company
ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE PROGRAM
2400 Nt-,SARoad 1, P.O. t,ox 58561, HOuston,Texas 77258-8561
713-333-5"11
March 30, 1992
M.DS-505
TO" ScottLazaroff/NA SA- J SCjEP53
Via: Eric Christian serd'NAS A- J SC/S N 3
Robert Franson,n_.ES C/B22 _ 9"
Demos Ts_s/LESC_JB22 ,..07-
FTOm: James L. Hyde/LES CUB22
Gfilian L. Shephazd/tESC/B30
Subject: PREDICTED NL.,nVIBER OF METEOROID AND DEBRIS IMPACTS ON
THE UTILITY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (UDS) TRAY
Please find attached the preliminary results of oar BUMPER-E vulnerability analysis of the UDS
ways. The predictions are based on a finite element model (I=EM) of the full ITDS way in the PMC
confimn'_don (]..VL/-I attitude). The FEM was developed from a desi=masketch tided "PIT UTILITY
CARRIERS -- FLAT PATTERN." Table 1 lists the tray dimensions that were shown in the sketch.
Table 2 _ves probability of no impact (PARDand expired number of impacts on the avionics and
fluids secdons for seven test panicle diameters. The "energy, scmJed_ameters" shown in the second
and third columns of _zble 2 were ca]cuJam,d using the equations 1 and 2.
Meteoroids: d.,=d=, _-_j x (Eq. 1)
Where p = 05 glee for 3/8", ]/4" & 1/8" particles and 1.0 glee for others...
x( 7 y'
Debris: d,_ = d,,.,, [, 10 ,) ('Sq. 2)
The results of thSsanalysishould be classified as preliminary,. Additional runsshould be made at
typical SSF atdmdes and a 6.rne-average prediction made for the expected number of impacts. The
BUMPER Phq code does not predict number of failures. It should be noted that one impact event
could cause muldple failures in the utility _ray. A more refined analysis will be performed in the
future.
°
Ja_es L. Hyde
Structures and Mechanics Deparmaent
Gill.JanL. Shephard
Structures and Mechanics Deparmaent
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Table D 1. UDS Tray Dimensions
tray
segment
$3
$2
$1
M1
P1
region
B1
B2
B1
B2
B3
B4
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B1
B2
!length (in) avionics
97.110 12.0
104.470 21.0
91.950 21.0
80.430 21.0
53.310 21--_33
54.310 33.0
101.200 33.0
100.420 33.0
101.380 33.0
68.235 33.0
68.235 33.0
100.530 33.0
98.530 33.0
96.530 33.0
compartment width (in)
face 2 (upper)
compartment width (in)
face6 (lower)
fluids total avionics fluids total
0.0 12.0 12.0 0.0 12.0
3.7 24.7 20.0 3.7 23.7
9.0 30.0 20.0 9--> 11.5
9.0 30.0 17.5 11.5 29.0
9.0 17.5--_33i 11.5 -
9.0 42.0 33.0 11.5 44.5
9.0 42.0 33.0 11.5 44.5
9.0 42.0 33.0 11.5 44.5
9.0 42.0 33.0 11.5 44.5
9.0 42.0 33.0 11.5---> 14 -
9--->11.5 - 33.0 14.0 47.0
11.5 44.5 33.0 14.0 47.0
11.5 44.5 33.0 14.0 47.0
11.5 44.5 33.0 14.0 47.0
P2
P3
B4 96.530 33.0
B5 98.530 33.0
B1 100.530 33.0
B2 68.235 33.0
B3 68.235 33.0
B4 101.380 33.0
B5 100.420 33.0
B6 101.200 33.0
B1 54.310 33.0
B2 53.310 33--->15
B3 80.430 15.0
B4 91.950 15.0
B 1 104.470 15.0
B2 97.110 12.0
11.5 44.5 33.0 14.0 47.0
11.5-->9 - 33.0 14.0 47.0
9.0 42.0 33.0 14.0 47.0
9.0 42.0 33.0 14.0 47.0
9.0 42.0 33.0 14-->9
9.0 42.0 33.0 9.0 42.0
9.0 42.0 33.0 9.0 42.0
9.0 42.0 33.0 9.0 42.0
9.0 42.0 33.0 9.0 42.0
9.0 33--->15 9.0
9.0 24.0 15.0 9.0 24.0
9.0 24.0 15.0 9.0 24.0
3.7 18.7 15.0 3.7 18.7
0.0 12.0 12.0 0.0 12.0
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